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Exchange-Market Interventions and Monetary Policy:
The German Experience.
The intervention policy of the German Bundesbank
after 1973 has been subject to several studies (Artus 1976,
Branson, Halttunen, Masson 1977, Vaubel 1979, Black 1980,
Dornbusch 1980). The present paper deviates from the
previous studies insofar as different sources of changes
in the Bundesbank's net foreign position (interventions
in the context of the European exchange-rate arrangement
("snake"/EMS), interventions in the DM/dollar-market, and
transactions outside the exchange markets) are analysed
separately. In the second part of the paper we examine
to what extent changes in the Bundesbank's net foreign
position have contributed to the deviations from the
monetary target in 1975 - 78.
+ The author wishes to thank the Deutsche Bundesbank
for providing additional data on interventions in
the DM/dollar-market and on transactions outside
the exchange market.- 2 -
I. The Intervention Policy of the German Bundesbank
1973-80
The Bundesbank publishes data on its exchange-market
interventions not on a daily basis but only for longer
and variable periods of which the shortest is two weeks
and the longest six months . In its statistics the
Bundesbank distinguishes between interventions in the
context of the European exchange-rate arrangement and
interventions in the DM/dollar-market (interventions
against other currencies have played no role). Reserve
changes due to transactions outside the exchange market
are listed separately.
Chart 1 shows the cumulative changes of the Bundesbank's
2 net foreign position and its components since March 1973
See table A in the appendix. In most cases the periods
have been chosen in a way that subperiods with mainly
equally directed reserve changes have been taken together.
2
Excluding changes due to valuation adjustments.
The changes in the Bundesbank's net foreign position which
are due to interventions also comprise interventions
by other monetary authorities in \tfhich the Bundesbank
participated indirectly, e.g., by giving a DM-credit to
another central bank which, then, used this credit to
support its currency in the exchange market.- 3 -
Chart 1: Cumulative Changes in the Bundesbank's Net Foreign
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Three features are clearly brought out by the Chart:
First, from March 1973 to April 1980 the Bundesbank
has accumulated a substantial amount of foreign re-
serves (total 21,6 bill. DM).
Second, this increase in the Bundesbank's net foreign
position has been exclusively the result of inter-
ventions; transactions outside the exchange market
("other" changes) even led to a considerable loss of
reserves in the 1973-80 period.
Third, since the outbreak of the dollar crisis in
autumn 1977 changes in the Bundesbank's net foreign
position have been more pronounced than in the pre-
ceeding period.
To give an impression of the relative importance of
the several components, an indicator of "reserve use"
(Williamson 1976, Suss 1976) has been calculated.
Table 1 shows the sum of reserve changes (irrespective
of their sign) for each component .
1
The values in table 1 are smaller than the overall
interventions, as the data which are provided by the
Bundesbank do not refer to all sales and purchases
of foreign currency but only to the balance of sales
and purchases in the respective periods.- 5-
Table 1: The Intensity of "Reserve Use'
Period Sum of absolute changes in the Bundesbank's
Net Foreign Position




















irrespective of the sign of the change; calculations
are based on the figures in table A.- 6 -
As can be seen, the strongest influence on the Bundes-
bank's net foreign position in the 1973-80 period came
from interventions in the DM/dollar-market. This result
is mainly due to the development since autumn 1977, for
in the preceeding period (March 1973 to September 1977)
interventions in the "snake" had been dominating. A
remarkable phenomenon is the increasing importance of
transactions outside the exchange market. In the period
from October 1977 to April 1980 these transactions led
to an even stronger "use" of reserves than the inter-
ventions in the European exchange-rate arrangement.
We shall now turn to the development of the several
components of the Bundesbank's net foreign position in
more detail.- 7 -
Interventions in the Context of the European
Exchange-rate Arrangement
When the adjustable-peg system of Bretton Woods finally
collapsed in March 1973, the currencies of the "snake"
members started to float jointly against the other
currencies. The participating countries were the
Benelux-countries, Denmark, France (from March 1973 to
January 1974 and from July 1975 to March 1976), Germany,
Norway (until December 1978) and Sweden (until August 1977).
When the EMS was introduced in March 1979 France, Ireland
and Italy joined the group of participating countries.
The cumulative changes of the Bundesbank's net foreign
position due to interventions in the "snake" respectively
the EMS show the typical pattern for a strong-currency
country in an adjustable-peg system (Chart 2). Periods
with relatively small exchange-rate changes and moderate
interventions (as 1975, the first half of 1977 and the
first half of 1978), are followed by periods with heavy
revaluation-pressure on the D-Mark and large increases in
the Bundesbank's foreign reserves resulting from either
direct interventions by the Bundesbank or from credits which
the Bundesbank gave to other member countries via the
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF).. Chart 2 shows
that large inflows of reserves finally led to an appreciation
of the D-Mark
1.
It should be noted that the size of the reserve inflow which
preceded the appreciation of the D-Mark shows an increase
over time. While the revaluation of June 1973 was pre-
ceded by a reserve inflow of 4 bill. DM, the respective
2
amounts were 8 bill. DM in autumn 1976 , 1o bill. DM in
When France left the "snake" in March 1976 this step also
led to an appreciation of the D-Mark against the French Franc.
2
The inflow of reserves that took place before France left
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autumn 1978 and 11 bill. DM in autumn 1979
1.
With the exception of the DM-appreciation in June 1973,
when the change in central rates did not lead to an
immediate reduction of revaluation pressure on the D-Mark,
the appreciations of the D-Mark were followed by a
2 reduction in the Bundesbank's stock of foreign reserves .
This outflow, however, has always been smaller than the
preceding inflow of reserves, so that on balance inter-
ventions have led to a stepwise increase in the net
foreign position. The total increase from April 1973
to April 1980 amounted to more than 3o bill. DM.
The observation that the Bundesbank experienced large
inflows of reserves before the DMark was finally revalued
indicates that there have been considerable delays in
the adjustment of central rates in the "snake" (see also
Vaubel 1979).
The introduction of the EMS has not led to more timely
adjustments. The strong inflow of reserves in autumn
1979, which was larger than previous inflows in the "snake",
even suggests that the EMS has worsened the chances for
undelayed parity adjustments.
See Table 1; the figure for the increase in reserves
preceding the appreciation in June 1973 cannot be seen
fror;; the table; it is taken from a statement of the German
Minister of Finance (see: Deutsche Bundesbank 1973, p.1).
2
A substantial part of this outflow results from
the repayment of credits which other central banks
had received from the Bundesbank under the EMCF
arrangements.- 10-
Interventions in the DM/Dollar Market
As the DM/dollar rate is officially floating since
March 1973 the Bundesbank is not obliged to intervene
in the DM/dollar market. Still interventions in this
market have been considerable and even stronger than the
interventions under the adjustable-peg system of the
"snake" or the EMS (see table 1).
According to the Bundesbank (1978 a, p.48) the ob-
jective of these interventions has been to* smooth
fluctuations in the DM/dollar exchange rate. In the
following we shall examine whether this attempt has been
successful .
Interventions in the DM/dollar market can be regarded
as stabilizing if two conditions are met (Lehment 1980,
Ch. 4):
In this paper we shall not discuss the question whether
exchange-rate oriented interventions are appropriate
from a general point of view as they may lead to violations
of internal policy targets; to this point see, e.g.,Lehment
(1980, Ch. 3).-11 -
(a) interventions have not been"aggressive" ,
(b) the Bundesbank's purchases and sales of reserves
resulting from interventions in the DM/dollar
market have balanced over time.
Condition (a) implies that interventions have not
intensified exchange-rate fluctuations (destabilizing
interventions). Condition (b) - which goes back to
Johnson (1939, p. 73) - implies that the Bundesbank
has not intervened against the trend.
In order to make precise statements on whether or not
the Bundesbank has intervened aggessively one would
require data on daily interventions (in cases where the
direction on the exchange-rate movement changed during
a day
 !figures for even shorter periods would be necessary).
Since data on interventions are, however, only published
for longer periods an evaluation of the Bundesbank's
intervention policy is subject to some degree of un-
certainty.
Chart 3 shows the exchange rate of the dollar against the
DM and the cumulative changes of the Bundesbank's net
foreign reserves caused by interventions in the DM/dollar-
market .
The Bundesbank would have intervened aggressively if it
had purchased dollars when the dollar was appreciating
and had sold dollars when the dollar was depreciating;
see the IMF-guidelines for countries with floating exchange
rates (IMF 1974, p. 203).
2
In drawing Chart 3 we made use of the information that the
increase of the net foreign position in the first half
of January 1978 resulted exclusively from interventions
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A comparison of the two curves shows that an appreciation
(depreciation) of the D-Mark went along with an increase
(decrease) of the Bundesbank's reserves in nearly all
periods. The only exception is the development in April/May
1973; during this period there was a net sale of dollars
although the D-Mark appreciated against the dollar.
This result, however, is not a clear evidence for "aggressive"
interventions. The comments which the Bundesbank gives in
its weekly reports rather indicate that in April/May 1973
the Bundesbank pursued an asymmetrical "leaning-against-
the-wind" (LAW) policy by selling a substantial amount of
dollars during the slight appreciation of the dollar in
April, while purchasing only relatively small amounts of
dollars when the dollar depreciated in May - an asymmetry
that can be explained by the huge increase of the Bundesbank's
reservejs in February/March 1973 during the last phase of
the Bretton-Woods-System.
A comparison of the two curves in Chart 3 also shows that
changes of the dollar/DM-rate and changes in reserves have
been quite symmetrical from summer 1973 until to the out-
break of the dollar-crisis in autumn 1977. This observatien is
confirmed by the result of the following regression for the
period August 1973 to September 1977
1"
1.
The regression which should mainly serve to support the
visual impression has to be treated with carej since it is
based on periods of different length there is no time
dimension. Thus, asymmetry in the present context implies
that the Bundesbank reacts to a one percent appreciation in
the same way as to a one percent depreciation irrespective
of whether the changes in the exchange rate take place within
two weeks or within several months.- 14"




2 = 0.81 D-W = 1.44 S.E. = 0.0.87
$ with: A NFP • = changes in the Bundesbank's net foreign
reserves due to interventions in the
DM/dollar market (in bill.DM)
A
e
 = percentage-point change in the
Dollar/DM rate
t-values are given in parentheses; indicates significance
at the 1 percent level.
The remarkable high explanatory content of the equation
indicates that the Bundesbank's interventions in the DM/dollar
market have been relatively symmetrical in the period under
consideration: a revaluation (devaluation) of the DM against
the dollar by one percentage point led to interventions in
the DM/dollar-market which caused an increase (decrease) of
the Bundesbank's net foreign position by an average amount
of 0.35 bill.DM
1.
If the regression is run for the period from October 1977
to April 1980 the explanatory content of the equation worsens
considerably:
This result is very similar to the results obtained
by Artus (1976) and Black (1980). It should be noted,
however, that these results are not directly comparable,
since the present calculation (a) covers a different period
and (b) is restricted to reserve changes which are caused
by interventions in the DM/dollar-market only whereas Artus
and Black consider all reserve changes. Moreover, Black's
calculations are not based on the bilateral DM/dollar
rate but on an effective exchange rate for the DM.- 15-






2 = 0.45 D-W = 2.71 S.E. 6.08
It is striking that the coefficient of the inde-
pendent variable is about three times as high as the
coefficient in the regression for the preceding period.
This indicates that "leaning-against-the-wind" in the
DM/dollar market has become stronger in the recent
years - a result that may to a substantial degree be
due to the increasing interventions by the U.S. monetary
authorities .
The substantially lower explanatory content of the
regression for the period after October 1977 may be
due to the fact that the Bundesbank (and possibly also
the U.S. monetary'authorities) intervened in a relatively
asymmetric fashion because of a stronger consideration
of exchange-rate targets for the dollar. If one regards,
e.g.,the development of the two curves in Chart 3 from
autumn 1977 to autumn 1978, one can see that the Bundes-
bank's reserves increased relatively strongly during the
If U.S. authorities use their credit facilities with
the Bundesbank to support the dollar, this leads to an
increase in the Bundesbank's reserves which is counted
as an "reserve change due to interventions in the DM/
dollar-market".- 16 -
the periods in which the dollar depreciated, whereas
they declined only slightly in early January and in the
second quarter of 1978 when the dollar appreciated.
This asymmetrical behavior could be explained in the
way that the Bundesbank regarded the fall of the dollar
as excessive and ,therefore, intervened relatively heavily,
whereas the recovery of the dollar was regarded as a
movement towards a more adequate exchange-rate level and
dampened only to a very small degree .
Since there is no evidence for aggressive interventions
it can be argued that the Bundesbank's interventions in
the DM/dollar market have not contributed to the fluctuations
of the dollar rate in the 1973-80 period. This result,
however, does not imply that the interventions have been
stabilizing. For- according to the second condition -
this will only have been the case if the reserve inflows
and outflows of the Bundesbank have balanced over time.
If one regards the development of the Bundesbank's foreign
reserves in Chart 3 under this aspect, only the interventions
up to autumn 1977 can be classified as stabilizing.
1
Swoboda (1979, p. 37) finds that since the transition
to a floating DM/dollar-rate German authorities have
on average leaned more heavily against a rise than against
a fall in the D-Mark. Dornbusch (1980, p. 43) presents
evidence for an effect of macroeconomic conditions on
the level of German intervention policy: "With higher
unemployment authorities use intervention to slow down
real dollar depreciation ....with high inflation unanti-
cipated dollar depreciation is opposed less strongly "- 17 -
From autumn 1977 to Mid-April 1980 the interventions in
the DM/dollar market have not balanced but have led to
a considerable net increase in the Bundesbank's reserves
so that part of the interventions must - at least so far -
be classified as interventions against the trend. These
interventions will only turn out to have been part of a
stabilizing operation if the Bundesbank sells the additional
reserves at a later point of time in order to dampen an
appreciation of the dollar. Finally, it should be noted
that interventions in the DM/dollar market do not only
affect the DM/dollar rate but also the exchange rate of the
D-Mark vis-a-vis the other "snake"/EMS currencies..
Thus, there is. the possibility. of mutually offsetting
interventions in the separate markets. This may, e.g., happen
if the Bundesbank on the one hand purchases D-Mark in order
to dampen an appreciation of the dollar and on the other
hand sells D-Mark in order to moderate an upward pressure
on the D-Mark in the "snake"/EMS (which results from or
is enforced by the interventions in the DM/dollar market).
Such offsetting interventions can be observed in 11 out
of the 38 periods listed in table A. They were especially
pronounced in August/September 1973 and May/June 1979 when
the interventions in the DM/dollar market led to a decline in
the Bundesbank's foreign reserves by 1.6 bill. DM respectively
4.1 bill. DM while the interventions in the "snake"/EMS
caused an inflow of reserves by an amount of 4.3 bill. DM
respectively 2.3 bill. DM.- 18 -
The role of "other" reserve movements
Those changes of the Bundesbank's net foreign reserves
which are not due to interventions in the exchange markets
consist of several quite different components:
interest receipts on foreign assets; in 1979
these receipts reached an amount of about 6.2 bill.DM;
inflows of reserves that result from conversions of
dollars by allied forces in West-Germany;
transactions which the Bundesbank carries out for
the government and other official institutions (e.g.
payments to the EC) ;
outflows of dollars due to conversions through the
Bundesbank of foreign D-Mark bonds and of notes and
credits raised by foreigners; the fact that the Bundes-
bank explicitly mentions these transactions in its
annual reports for 1978 and 1979 indicates that the
importance of this component has increased in the last
years;
inflows and outflows of reserves that result from
swap-operations with domestic banks; these operations
have reached considerable amounts since March 1979
(see Bundesbank 1979, p. 57);
repayments of swap credits which the U.S. monetary
authorities have received from the Bundesbank and
which are settled with D-Mark that the U.S. authorities
have acquired through other transactions
than interventio-ns in the DM/dollar market;- 19 -
a reduction of the Bundesbank's net foreign
position which results from the fact that U.S.
authorities deposit part of the receipts from
the issue of DM-bonds ("Carter-bonds") at the
Bundesbank. Such an operation is similar to
a restrictive open-market operation by the
Bundesbank (with the difference that the Bundes-
bank's balance sheet does not show a reduction
in assets but instead an increase in liabilities).
Chart 4 shows that reserve changes which did not result
from exchange-market interventions made a negative
contribution to the Bundesbank's foreign reserves in
the period 1973-80, the main reason being the large
outflow of reserves under this category since autumn
1977. This outflow was in the order of about 31 bill.DM
and was higher than the inflow of reserves due to inter-
ventions in the DM/dollar market during the same period .
The loss of net foreign reserves caused by "other" trans-
actions was most pronounced in 1979 when it amounted to
21 bill. DM.
2
This development can be explained by three factors :
additional reserve outflows due to transactions
for official institutions;
larger conversions of foreign D-Mark bonds
through the Bundesbank, and - probably most important -
reductions in the Bundesbank's net foreign position which
indirectly resulted from the additional intervention
On balance, however, the Bundesbank's net foreign position
increased considerably in this period as the Bundesbank also
experienced a large inflow of reserves through intervention
in the "snake"/EMS.
2
Swap operations with domestic banks have not contributed
to this loss of reserves in 1979; on balance they even led
to a slight increase in. the net foreign position (Bundes-
bank 1979, p. 57).- 20
Chart 4: Cumulative Changes of the Bundesbank's Net Foreign
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activity of the U.S. monetary authorities: on
the one hand the U.S. authorities received D-Mark
credits from the Bundesbank which they used for
outright-interventions in the exchange market to
support the dollar and which led to increases in
the Bundesbank's net foreign reserves "due to inter-
ventions in the DM/dollar market"; on the other
hand, the U.S. authorities settled a large part of
these credits^ through transfers of D-Mark which they
had acquired outside the exchange market (e.g., by
the issue of "Carter-bonds") and which, hence, led
to reserve losses "due to other transactions".
Chart 4 clearly shows the divergent movement of the inter-
vention components and the "other" components of the Bundes-
bank's net foreign reserves - a divergence that can to a
large degree be attributed to the specific way in which the U.S.
authorities settle their liabilities with the Bundesbank.
It should be noted, however, that the divergence only holds
for the longer run. A short-run analysis shows that reserve
changes caused by interventions and reserve changes caused by
"other" factors have an opposite sign only in 13 out of the
38 subperiods in table A. It is, however, remarkable that
an opposite sign is present in almost all cases in which the
intervention-induced reserve changes have been relatively large
As can be seen from table A such an opposite sign appears
in 5 out of 6 subperiods in which the intervention-induced
reserve changes have been above 8 bill. DM.- 22 -
This observation indicates, that in some cases the Bundes-
bank may have tried to neutralize the effect of the inter-
ventions on the monetary base not only through opposite
movements of the domestic component of the monetary base
(see the following part of this paper) but also through
measures which - like swap operations - led to offsetting
changes in net foreign reserves .
1
Thus, in March/April 1979 interventions in the exchange
market caused a decline in the Bundesbank's foreign re-
serves by 8.3 bill. DM while at the same time swap-operations
with domestic banks added 4.7 bill. DM to foreign reserves.
A similar - although reverse - development took place in
the period from June to September 1979 when interventions
raised reserves by 27.4 bill. DM whereas swap operations
lowered reserves by 5.3. bill. DM (see Deutsche Bundesbank
1979, p. 57) .- 23 -
II. Exchange Market Interventions and the Monetary Target
Interventions in the exchange market which lead to
a change in the Bundesbank's net foreign reserves also
affect the German monetary base. Empirical investi-
gations for the Bretton-Woods-period, however, show that
the Bundesbank neutralized the effect of its inter-
ventions on the monetary base to a very large extent
through offsetting changes in the domestic component
of the monetary base (Willms 1971, Herring, Marston 1977)
a policy that was continued also after March 1973.
Chart 5 shows the quarterly changes of the Bundesbank's
net foreign position (excluding changes due to valu-
ation adjustments and new allocations of SDR ) and the
quarterly changes of the domestic component of the ex-
2 tended monetary base in the period 1973 II to 1980 I.
As can be seen from the chart, changes in the net foreign.
These changes are excluded as they lead to changes
of the net foreign position which do not affect the
monetary base.
2
The extended monetary base B is defined as
B
e = B + B
r
with B = monetary base
B
r= cumulative changes of minimum reserves since
1960 due to changes in reserve ratios (see
Andersen, Jordan, 1968).
The changes of the domestic component of the monetary base
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports; own calculations.- 25 -
position and changes in the domestic base component
have an opposite sign in 26 out of 28 quarters. This
indicates that the effect of exchange-market inter-
ventions and other reserve changes on the monetary base
has nearly always been neutralized by domestic policy
measures (open-market operations, discount policy,
minimum-reserve changes etc.)
Information on the strength of the neutralization
policy can be obtained from the following regression
AB






RHO = 0.39 R
2 = 0.96 D-W = 2.44 S.E.= 1.44
(2.25)
S 1 and S 4 are seasonal dummy variables for the
first and the fourth quarter. The regression exhibits
a significant negative relation between changes in the
net foreign position and changes in the domestic compon-
ent of the extended monetary base. In the period
from 1973 II to 1980 I the Bundesbank on average steril-
ized 94 per cent of an in - or outflow of foreign
2
reserves through off-setting domestic policy measures .
Estimated with the Cochran-Orcutt transformation
to account for autocorrelation of residuals.
2
A similar result is found by Branson, Halttunen, Masson
(1977) for the period 1974-76.- 26 -
This sterilization coefficient is somewhat higher than
the respective coefficients which have been found in
investigations for the Bretton-Woods-period - a result
which indicates that the Bundesbank's neutralization
policy has been more pronounced since the transition to
2
a floating DM/dollar rate .
Next we shall consider the question to which extent the
exchange-market interventions have led - despite the
sterilizing operations - to deviations from the Bundes-
bank's monetary target.
Since December 1974 the Bundesbank has regularly announced
for the following year a monetary target which is
stated in terms of central bank money as defined by the
Bundesbank.. This monetary aggregate which shows a similar
behavior as M3 differs from the monetary base insofar as
1
Willms (1971) obtains a coefficient of 0.86 for the
period 1958-70; Marston, Herring (1977) find a co-
efficient of 0.91 for the period 1960-71.
2
It should be noted, however, that neutralization policies
do not only offset the effect of exchange-market inter-
ventions on the monetary base. They also reduce the effect
which the interventions have on the exchange rate - and may,
thus, give rise to a new round of interventions and sterilizing
operations.- 27 -
bank's deposits at the Bundesbank which consist of
excess reserves or of minimum reserves on deposits
of non-domestic residents are excluded;
minimum reserves on deposits by domestic
residents are calculated on the basis of constant
reserve ratios .
For each of the years 1975 to 1978 the Bundesbank had
- • ' 2
announced an increase of central bank money by 8 per cent .
For the years 1979 and 1980 the Bundesbank announced a target
range of 6 to 9 per cent respectively 5 to 8 per cent for
the erowth of central bank money (fourth quarter as against
the fourth quarter of the previous year). While the Bundes-
bank stayed within the target range in 1979 and - at least
so far - in 1980, there have been substantial deviations from
the target in the years 1975 to 1978.. Thus, central bank
money increased by 10 per cent in 1975, by 9.2 per cent in
1976, by 9.0 per cent in 1977 and by 11.4 per cent in 1978.
Table 2 shows the quarterly increase of central bank money
for the period 1975-78 (seasonally adjusted, annual rates).
If the announced increase in central bank money is distribut-
ed evenly over the quarters of the respective years the actual
rates of increase are above the target rates in 14 out of
16 quarters; in 2 quarters (1975 II and 1976 I)they were below the
1
As to the problems of using central bank money as the basis
for a monetary target see Neumann (1975).
2
For 1975 the Bundesbank stated the target in terms of the
change from December 1975 to December 1974. For 1 976 to 1978
the target was stated in terms of the annual average as
against the annual average of the previous year.- 23 -
target .
To which extent have these deviations been the result
of interventions in the exchange market and other reserve
changes? The effect of this factor can be seen from column
2 in table 2. The figures show the hypothetical percentage
change in central bank money that would have occured if
the domestic component of central bank money had remained
unchanged.
Table 2 shows that in 6 out of the 14 quarters in which the
monetary expansion exceeded its target value the deviation
can be attributed to the strong increase in the Bundesbank's
foreign reserves.
1
The quarterly rates of increase that would have been
consistent with the monetary target are (at annual
rates): 7.8 p.c. for 1975; 6.0 p.c. for 1976; 7.6. p.c.
for 1977; 6.1 p.c. for 1978. A regular quarterly in-
crease by 7.8. p.c. (annual rate) in 1975 corresponds -
because of the higher average base - to an annual increase
hy 8.0 p.c. The relatively low target figures for
the other three years result from overhangs that existed
when monetary targets were announced on the basis of annual
averages °.
2
These cases are characterized by the fact that the
figure in the first column of table 2 is lower than the
respective figure in the second column; this implies that
the domestic component has changed in the negative direction
and has, hence, not contributed the monetary expansion.- 29 -
Table 2: The Effect of Changes in the Net Foreign
Position on the Development of Central
Bank Money
Increase in Central Change in the Net
Bank Money against Foreign Position
Previous Quarter against Previous
(seasonally adjust- Quarter as Percent-
ed, annual rate) age of Central Bank
Money (seasonally

































































The sign in brackets shows whether the actual increase
of central bank money was above (+) or below (-) the
target-path (see footnote 1 on p.2% ).
Excluding changes due to valuation adjustments and new
allocations of SDR
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank; own calculations.- 30 -
The majority of these deviations occured during the
sharp decline of the dollar from October 1977 to December
1978.
In another 7 quarters, however, the target was overshot
although the Bundesbank's net foreign reserve remained
unchanged or even declined. In the second quarter of
1978, e.g., central bank money increased at a seasonally
adjusted annual rate of 9.4. p.c. despite a substantial
outflow of foreign reserves. In these cases, therefore,
the overshooting of the target has to be attributed to
domestic factors .
In respect to the two quarters in which the monetary ex-
pansion was below the target only the deviation in the
second quarter of 1975 can be explained by changes in the
foreign component as there has been a reserve outflow which
dampened the monetary expansion. The deviation in the
first quarter of 1976 cannot be attributed to exchange market
interventions; without the decline in the domestic component
the interventions would have even led to a substantial over-
shooting of the tar_get. This observation also indicates
that a judgement about the exchange-rate policy of
a central bank which is based only on exchange-market inter-
ventions may be misleading; if one considers also the
restrictive domestic policy measures and the resulting
"undershooting" of the target it may well be that
despite the large purchases of foreign currency the
Bundesbank has intensified rather than moderated the
revaluation of the D-Mark in the first quarter of 1976.
1
The deviation in the first quarter of 1977 cannot be
attributed to only one of the two components, as both
components show an increase in this period.- 31 -
III. Conclusion
In concluding three aspects should be stressed:
- . The volume of reserve changes which are due
. to transactions outside the exchange market
has risen considerably in the last years.
Therefore, the overall change in the Bundes-
bank's net foreign reserves may no longer
give an adequate picture of the intervention
activity.
The changes in the Bundesbank's reserves also
reflect interventions by other central banks -
an aspect which has become more important in
the last years due to the sometimes heavy inter-
ventions by the U.S. monetary authorities
since the begin of the dollar crisis in autumn
1977. This raises difficulties especially
for the interpretation of reaction functions in
which changes of the Bundesbank's foreign re-
serves are the dependent variable. For the
question arises to which extent the function
describes the reaction of other monetary author-
ities rather than the reactions of the Bundesbank.
The exchange - market interventions can only
partly be made responsible for the overshooting
of the Bundesbank's monetary target in the years
1975 - 78, since overshooting also occured in
periods when the Bundesbank's foreign reserves
actually declined. A considerable part of the
deviations was, therefore, due to domestic factors- 32 -
Appendix
Table A: Changes in the Bundesbank's Net Foreign Position
April 1973 - April 1980 in bill. DM (excluding
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